We evaluate how the productive structure and level of specialization of a hospital affect technical efficiency by analyzing a six-year panel database (2000/2005) drawn from hospital discharge records and Ministry of Health data. We adopt a distance function approach, while measuring the technical efficiency level with stochastic frontier techniques. After controlling for environmental variables and hospital case-mix, inefficiency is negatively associated with specialization and positively associated with capitalization. Capitalization is typical of private structures which, on average, use resources less efficiently with respect to public and not-for-profit hospitals. Finally, by looking at scale elasticities, we find some evidence of unexploited economies of scale, leaving room for centralization.
Introduction
The main objective of this paper is to evaluate how the productive structure and level of specialization of a hospital affect its technical efficiency. Here, we define productive structure as the degree of capitalization of the hospital, while the degree of specialization refers to the number of different types of cases treated within the organization. To this end, we report an economic analysis measuring the evolution of technical efficiency in hospitals located in the Italian region of Lazio in the 2000-2005 period. Subsequently, we assess the robustness of the hospitals' optimizing behavior about ten years after the introduction of the Diagnosis Related Group (DRG) system, and explore differences in efficiency as related to the hospitals' ownership structure. Finally, we offer some insights as to how hospital scale of activity and productive conditions are determined by the institutional framework.
In Italy, the introduction of the DRG system in 1992 served both as a means of prospective payment and as an instrument for efficient allocation of resources. This should have made it possible to properly classify, measure, and assess hospitals' performance by using industrial organization and management methods. Moreover the system applied to all organizations, independent of whether they were privately or publicly owned. As a consequence of the reform, hospitals were made responsible for their own outcomes, partially assuming the burden of financial risk. Further, budget constraints were made more binding for financing institutions, and this affected incentives to curb health consumption and production. As a result, two patterns emerged: on one hand, producers were encouraged to optimize their productive processes given the available inputs, and on the other hand, resource availability was reduced.
The empirical literature on hospital efficiency in Italy consists of a substantial number of studies with a variety of methodologies, scopes, and results. Unexploited economies of scale are a recurrent theme (see Grassetti et al. [6] ). Public hospital trusts (Aziende Ospedaliere, hereforeward referred to as AO) appear more efficient than other hospital types, such as acute-care and rehabilitation hospitals directly managed by local health authorities (Presidi Ospedalieri, ASLH), 1 but such a crystal clear difference is not observed in a comparison of public and private hospitals. Finally, technical efficiency seems to have decreased in the second half of the nineties, after the introduction of prospective payments under the DRG (see Barbetta et al. [1] ).
Any analysis of hospital efficiency must take into account the so-called "Newhouse critique". In his 1994 article, Newhouse [10] argued that neither parametric nor non-parametric classical methodologies are adequate for examining hospital production efficiency because these methodologies require excessive simplification of the production process. Model specifications are, in fact, generally restrictive: they omit some relevant inputs and outputs without taking into account the quality characteristics of the services provided. Further, hospital outputs are extremely heterogeneous. The number of discharged patients gives a rough measure of overall hospital production, if we do not take into ac-count other aspects of treatment, such as the type and the severity of illness, the presence of other illnesses, the overall characteristics of the patient, and the like. We partially address these critiques by using a dataset with good quality administrative data on hospital case-mix, and by making use of distance functions to represent technology. However, we acknowledge that this approach is still limited, since distance functions may be still mis-specificied and the quality of the hospital service is still not included in our analysis. The paper is organized as follows: in the next section, we provide background on the analytical foundations of production economics, describing the concept of efficiency used throughout the paper, and the econometric techniques used for its estimation. Subsequently, we present our data and provide some summary statistics, and in section 3 we report the results of our estimations. We conclude by commenting on our findings.
1 Theoretical background
Technology representation
The notion of technical efficiency refers to producers' choices to allocate the resources at their disposal to obtain the maximum possible output from given inputs, or to use the minimum possible inputs in the production of a given level of outputs. Therefore, the analysis of technical efficiency may be defined as either output-oriented or input-oriented. 2 When multiple inputs are used to produce multiple outputs, Shephard's distance functions [13] provide a characterization of the structure of production technology. Let x = (x 1 , . . . , x N ) ∈ R N ++ be the vector of inputs used to produce the vector of outputs y = (y 1 , . . . , y M ) ∈ R M ++ 3
Definition 1 (Input distance function) D I (x, y) = max{λ : x/λ ∈ L(y)} gives the maximum amount by which an input vector can be radially contracted and still remains feasible for the output vector it produces.
Definition 2 (Output distance function) D O (x, y) = min{µ : y/µ ∈ P (x)} gives the minimum amount by which an output vector can be radially expanded and still remains producible with a given input vector.
where L(y) are input sets and P (x) output sets. In this paper the distance to the frontier is represented by the Debreu-Farrell radial measure of technical efficiency, which has adequate properties and may be written as follows Definition 3 (Multiple output production frontiers) If any number of outputs is produced, an input oriented measure of technical efficiency is given by the function TE I (y, x) = min{ϑ : D I (y, ϑx) ≥ 1)}, while an output oriented measure is a function T E O (x, y) = max{φ :
In what follows we have considered for each output the sum of DRG weights as final goods of the productive process, i.e. the number of discharges corrected for its case-mix complexity. More than technical efficiency we are measuring what has been defined by Zweifel and Breyer [16] "internal medical efficiency". However we are totally ignoring "external medical efficiency", or hospitals' effectiveness, defined as the ability of a hospital to improve the health status of a patient, for a given number of discharges or a given length of stay. A definition of output including external medical efficiency would be conceptually more accurate than the definition we use, but this would be empirically far more difficult to analyze, due to the lack of data reporting indicators of patients' health status following post-discharge recovery.
Stochastic distance functions
A general cross-sectional multiple-output stochastic frontier model can be written as
where
is the output distance function used to represent the distance from the frontier, which allows technological interactions across and among inputs and outputs. y i represents the output vector of the i-th hospital, x i is a vector of inputs and z i is a vector of hospital specific characteristics other than inputs. β is the parameter vector which describes the structure of the technology. The error component is divided in two parts: v i is an idiosyncratic normal term with zero mean, whereas u i is an asymmetric negatively skewed distribution which captures inefficiency among observations. An analogous substitution relationship between factors and outputs showing deviations from the frontier is given by the input distance function
1 and 2 can be rewritten as stochastic distance function models
The dependent variable in 3 and 4 is not observable. Therefore in order to empirically estimate both equations we have to convert them into estimable models. This task can be accomplished by exploiting the fact that D O is linear homogenous in outputs, while D I in inputs, i.e.
As it has been pointed out by Lovell et al. [8] , one way of imposing such restriction is to normalize D O and D I respectively by one of the outputs and one of the inputs (so called "ratio" model), i.e.
which lead to
Substituting equalities 9 and 10 into equations 3 and 4 and dividing both sides respectively by y 1i and x 1i generates the following estimable composed error models
In the multi-output version of the model, the dependent variable is the reciprocal of the normalizing output, and the regressors are the inputs and the normalized outputs. Finally u i provides the basis for a reciprocal measure of output-oriented technical efficiency. Similar considerations applies for the multi-input case.
Some authors like Kumbhakar and Lovell [7] have proposed the Euclidean norm of the outputs (or inputs) in order to respect the linear homogeneity restriction (so called "norm" model). We did not use such normalization because of two main reasons: firstly, the degree of multicollinearity increases considerably, due to the introduction of exact linear dependencies; and second, the norm model is more susceptible to endogeneity bias, since normalized outputs appearing as regressors may not be exogenous.
Note that while modelling multiple-input, multiple-output technologies we have to restrictively assume that the disturbance terms affect the output vector y multiplicatively, i.e. all outputs are assumed to be proportionally affected by the same disturbance.
Three major drawbacks affect cross-sectional stochastic frontier models:
1. Estimations strongly rely on distributional assumptions on each error component. is observed in hospitals with emergency rooms. Therefore, the observation of the DRG weight is extremely important for the objectives of the study, since it not only makes it possible to capture the number of treated cases, but also provides a measure of case-mix control for each output. This allows us to overcome one of the concerns raised by Newhouse.
The aggregation of the DRGs followed a classification system which is commonly used at an international level, and which has already been applied to Italian data (see Fabbri [3] ). Within this classification, hospital activity may be summarized in twenty-eight production categories. These are made up of DRG groups consistent with a standard of productive homogeneity. 4 In order to make the model empirically more manageable, we have further aggregated these 28 lines into the following groups: complex surgery, emergency room treatments, cancers and HIV, general medicine, and general surgery.
As far as the measurement of output is concerned, it is well known that frontier techniques work best when the product is homogeneous and one-dimensional such as, for instance, kilowatt-hours in the electricity industry. As pointed out by Newhouse, this is not the case for hospital care, which exhibits wide variation in the quality of the product and its dimensionality, both on the input and the output sides. Therefore, it would be possible that productive units being assessed might not use the same technologies. In order to control at least partially for these types of differences, we have restricted our focus to acute patients. Acute care refers to the necessary treatment of a disease for a short period of time in which a patient is treated for a brief but severe episode of illness. The goal of the hospital is to discharge the patient as soon as he or she is deemed sufficiently healthy and stable following the critical period. Acute care differs from long-term care and rehabilitation care, which are characterized by a combination of treatments provided once the acute phase of the disease has been overcome. These treatments aim to stabilize the disease towards two possible outcomes: recovery or management of a chronic condition.
Hospitals devoting their activity exclusively to long-term and/or rehabilitation care, therefore, have very different production functions from acute-care hospitals, which would make the two groups impossible to compare. For this reason, we did not include such hospitals in the sample. For those hospitals dedicated only partially to post-acute care, we did not include the DRG weights from postacute care activities in any of the output aggregates. Relatedly, when hospital activity is limited to the treatment of acute patients, this simplifies the debate as to whether the variable measuring output should be the number of discharges or the number of inpatient days. The latter variable may more heavily reflect the assistance component of hospital production, which is unique to structures dedicated to long-term care and rehabilitation, and hence it may reflect a productive choice of the hospital rather than the hospital's efficiency level. 5 We obtained data concerning inputs from the Italian Ministry of Health. These included: number of beds as a rough measure of capital and number of physicians, nurses and other personnel (teaching plus ancillary staff) as a measure of labor. By classifying labor into different categories we recognized differing skill requirements. We are aware that number of hours worked may be a better indicator of the labor factor, since it reveals more about the use of the workforce, but unfortunately such information is not available. 6 As mentioned above in discussing the measure of outputs, some hospitals undertake both acute and post-acute care activity. Therefore, for consistency, we must eliminate this element from the inputs. For the bed variable, this exclusion was straightforward, since we received data on beds for rehabilitation and long-term care. However, hospital staff numbers were reported with no information on the type of care they provided. Therefore we constructed a simple measure of utilization, dividing the number of inpatient days for acute patients by the total number of inpatient days. This ratio was multiplied by each category of workers and to provide the measure of inputs used in the estimation.
Both public and private hospitals providing health care services are present in the sample. Public hospitals are almost exclusively financed by public funds, while both for-profit and not-for-profit hospitals rely on a mix of public and private funds. In order to compare productive units and make them as homogeneous as possible, we must control for differences in the source of funding. For this reason, in private hospitals, we consider only those services covered by public funds. In this way we are excluding those hospitals which did not sign any type of agreement with the National Health System (NHS) and are exclusively devoted to a "pure" for-profit activity. For the sake of consistency, for private hospitals we included in our sample only the number of beds accredited with the NHS and a proportional fraction of their personnel (i.e. the number of workers in each category multiplied by the share of beds in agreement with the NHS divided by the total number of beds). to all size-related measures: fewer beds and personnel, and a lower sum of DRG weights. Further, they are specialized and concentrated on less complex cases, as can be seen, for instance, by the low number of emergency room treatments. This appearance is confirmed by the hospital specialization index we have computed. Formally, for the h-th hospital, the Gini ratio is equal to
where N is equal to 20, the total number of existing Major Diagnostic Categories (MDC), q i is the fraction of the total discharges treated by the first i MDCs, while p i is the ratio of the number of the i-th MDC over the total number of MDCs. The index varies between 0 and 1: it is equal to zero in case of perfect equidistribution (polispecialistic medical center), since all the differences p i − q i are null. Meanwhile it is equal to one in case of maximum specialization, since equation (13) boils down to quantity
The Gini ratio may be computed by using DRGs instead of MDCs and in this case N of equation (13) would equal 489, the total numebr of existing DRGs. Using DRGs for this measure of specialization would be more appropriate, since it better captures the hospital production complexity. However due to the fact that hospitals tend to focus on more remunerative and less costly practices, the array of DRGs chosen by hospitals tends to be very narrow. Therefore the index of specialization is very high for all hospitals and on average it is similar for all ownership categories. In order to get a variable with a greater and more significative range of variation, we use as MDCs, where diagnoses correspond to a single organ system or etiology and are associated with a particular medical specialty. 7 
Empirical implementation
The models
The functional form of f (·) may take different aspects. With a Cobb-Douglas specification we can interpret coefficients as output elasticities, since the covariates are all expressed in logs. In this application however we cannot estimate this log-linear function, since in a distance function context, Cobb-Douglas has the wrong curvature in the
spaces. Therefore we have estimated a translog function, where the presence of squared and interaction terms gives a high degree of flexibility.
For the multi-output multi-input stochastic frontier consider the two following models
− ln
where in both models i denotes hospital, k, j denote inputs, m, n denote outputs, and h denotes shifting factors. y mi is the m-th output variable for hospital i and a symmetry constraint has been imposed on the interaction terms, i.e. α mn = α nm . Further x ik is the k-th input variable for hospital i and a symmetry constraint has been imposed on the interaction terms, i.e. β kj = β jk . 8 In model 14 y 1i is the output used for normalization, which is given by the sum of the DRG weights of the discharges in complex surgery. On the other hand in model 15 the number of beds, x 1i , is the input used for normalization. Since we treat the z h factors as fixed effects, this translog function is not fully flexible. In addition to input variables we included
• Time dummies for each year of the sample, using 2000 as the base year. Using a set of time dummy variables is the same as running time fixed effects without considering panel effects.
• Two variables concerning ownership: one dummy if the hospital is private and another one if the hospitals is NFP, i.e. if it has been assimilated to a public structure. "Fully" public hospitals represent the base category. 9
• Geographical dummies for each ASL. For the county of Rome we distinguished between hospitals directly managed by Local Health Authorities (Rome-asl) and self-managed hospitals (Rome-self).
Before getting into the details of the model and commenting the results we would like to remark that our estimations were based exclusively on a pooling of data. That is, we treated the observations as part of a single cross-section. The reasons are explained through a simple decomposition of the total sum of squares (SST). For a generic variable z it observed for hospital i at time t, SST is equal to the sum of the between hospitals sum of squares, SSB(i), and the within hospitals sum of squares,
where z .. is the global mean and z i. denotes the average of z it over t. To standardize the results we divide SSB(i) and SSW (i) by SST in order to calculate the percentage of both components. Since most of the variation in the input and output variables is between rather than within the hospitals it seems there is very little panel data variation in the sample, which is similar to a cross-section.
Estimates' results
As a first step of our analysis, we ran a pooled OLS regression in order to provide a simple test The second stage consisted of a general-to-specific estimation and test approach. In order to estimate technology parameters and technical efficiency we added the following set of assumptions:
Equation 16 and 17 tell us the variance of the idiosyncratic error term and the variability of the inefficiency term are not constant. These have been modelled in equations 19 and 20 respectively.
Further by using the truncated normal distribution for the inefficiency term u i we can parameterize its mean µ. We must note that seeking to address the problem of heteroscedasticity by parameterizing the variance of the inefficiency error term and parameterizing the mean of the truncated normal distribution (thus changing its shape) can be seen as another approach to study the exogenous effects on inefficiency, as has been pointed out by Kumbhakar and Lovell [7] . Degree of competitive pressures, managerial characteristics or even ownership form may influence the structure of the technology by which conventional inputs are converted to outputs or may influence the efficiency with which inputs are converted to outputs. Moreover this particular combination of distributional assumptions allows us to accomodate non-monotonic efficiency effects. This implies that variables having such relationship can be positively related in part of the parameter space while negatively related in the rest (see Wang [14] for more details). Last but not least, Wang and Schmidt [15] have demonstrated that this model specification allows one-step estimation of the parameters, avoiding two-step procedures which give biased results if the model estimated at the first step is misspecified. Further they note that the vector of variables affecting the frontier may overlap the vector of variables affecting technical efficiency.
In this paper we are intended to study the impact of specialization and capitalization on hospital efficiency. Therefore we have included for both models in equation (18) the Gini ratio (Gini) as proxy for specialization and the nurses per bed ratio (Nurses/Bed) as proxy for capitalization. This latter variable has been already used as determinant of cost efficiency in previous studies. Farsi and
Filippini [5] showed that a higher nurses per bed ratio decreases efficiency, indicating that quality of care is costly. We implemented some general likelihood ratio (LR) tests, while posing restrictions on the unrestricted translog model, in order to get to a "preferred" model. The LR test is given by λ =
, where ln L 0 and ln L 1 denote the maximum log-likelihood value under the null hypothesis H 0 and the alternative H 1 , respectively. The LR tests conducted are presented in Table 3 .
For both models, the first two null hypothesis assessed the appropriateness of using the half-normal distribution (µ i = 0), with and without modelling heteroscedasticity. We then tested the importance of modelling the variance of the error terms (w i = 0, t i = 0). Finally we tested whether exogenous inefficiency variables, as a group, have a significant impact on technical inefficiency. All these hypothesis were strongly rejected. More generally we can say that we cannot do without unmodeled heteroscedasticity in the error components and nor without modelling the mean of the inefficiency error term.
In table 4 we show scale and input/output elasticities, which are more meaningful than the simple technology parameters in a translog function context. Elasticities have been estimated at the means of the variables in the data. Standard errors were computed by applying the delta method to linearize the elasticity functions around the estimated parameter values and then using standard formulas for the variances and covariances of linear functions of random variables. The results given in table 4 suggest significant increasing returns to scale for both models, since scale elasticities ǫ y,x > 1 and ǫ x,y < 1 and the null hypothesis of constant returns to scale is rejected. From an administrative point of view, this is the typical situation where there is an incentive to centralize operations.
The individual input and output elasticities underlying the scale elasticities are also provided. In the output distance model, elasticity for nurses and beds is high while the marginal product of other staff labor is slightly negative, even if not statistically significant. Therefore it seems there is some excess in the size of the group of workers with administrative and technical duties. Moreover from the input-oriented model we can see that all marginal costs, except from ER treatments, are positive and that not surprisingly general medicine (Y5) and general surgery (Y4) are the outputs primarily contributing to input use.
Focusing on existing differences among ownership structures, which we do not report here, scale elasticity varies a great deal between hospitals, and is greater for private hospitals and lower for NFP structures in both models. However this is not surprising, and may simply reflect the existence of ceilings on fee-for-service financing, which have been introduced in Lazio region. The main difference between public and NFP hospitals and private structures is that the latter cannot surpass fixed volume limits, while the former are at least reimbursed at a reduced rate once having reached the ceiling, or may even be fully reimbursed because of the political necessity of avoiding hospital failures. Therefore, a possible effect of this different treatment is input-minimizing behavior in private structures, which are forced to work at a reduced scale. Further, private units are slightly over-capitalized with respect to nursing staff, while public and more heavily NFP hospitals have a slight excess of administrative and technical staff , suggesting the opportunity for a re-allocation of resources within these structures
In table 5 we show maximum likelihood estimates of the remaining parameters of the hybrid translog production functions, other than technology parameters. We also show the equations of the two heteroscedasticity terms and the mean of the inefficiency term. With respect to ownership,, the coefficient for NFP hospitals is always significant (at least at a 10% level) with a positive sign. 10 The role played by private hospitals is, in contrast, less straightforward. They positively and significantly contribute to an upward shift of the frontier in the input-oriented model but the sign is reversed in the output model, even though it is not statistically significant. Time dummies show a positive trend, with ever-increasing coefficient values, and are not significant only for the first two years of the output distance model. It might be interpreted that we are capturing a linear time trend or disembodied technical change. As far as geographical dummies are concerned, the base category is represented by the hospitals in the county of Rome, but not within this municipality. It appears that hospitals in all the other counties, except those self-managed hospitals located in Rome, contribute to an upward shift of the frontier.
Regarding the determinants of the mean of the inefficiency error term, for the input model, mean age is positively correlated with inefficiency, while for both models size measures, capitalization and specialization are instead negatively correlated. Particularly, nurses per bed and gini are 1% significant in the input model, but only at 5% and 10% in the output distance model respectively. The result obtained for specialization is strengthened if we look at the sign of cross-output terms (see table 6) , that allow us to evaluate input and output complementarities. From the input specification we observe that only three cross-output terms over ten are negative, two of them being significant. 11 The absence of output jointness is not a proof of pro-efficiency specialization, but a fact that is consistent with this hypothesis.
Before commenting on efficiency results we would like to remark that in our models we have attempted to control for quality. This can be broadly divided into outcome and structural indicators.
With respect to the outcome indicators, we have computed readmission and mortality rates as quality adjustments or scaling factors for output measures. As noted by Milne and Clarke [9] , both indicators have big drawbacks. Further we did not feel confident with using readmission rates, since we could not distinguish between patients with planned vs. unplanned readmission. Hence the computed rate depends subjectively only on the number of days used as threshold. Mortality rates, in contrast, were easily measured, but their impact on the estimation is negligible, likely due to the fact that they are very rare across inpatient specialties.
For structural measures of quality, we tried including the teaching status of the hospitals in the frontier of both models, using the number of teaching staff as a proxy, and an attraction index, proxied by the rate of discharges of people coming from a different ASLH. Signs were not significant, and efficiency estimates with and without these variables were highly correlated. Hence, we decided not to include them in the models. It is therefore possible that without being able to properly account for quality our estimates may suffer from omitted variable bias. However as Rosko and Mutter [12] pointed out, these omissions may not be as serious as commonly thought.
Technical efficiency: trends and transitions
In figure 1 we show estimated sample mean efficiencies for each hospital ownership category. In the output distance model, public and NFP hospitals are on average more efficient than the accredited private ones. We observe a decline in technical efficiency over time for NFP hospitals, and a smaller reduction for private ones, while public hospitals seem to remain at a roughly constant efficiency level throughout the period. In order to explain such differences, as we mentioned in the discussion of scale elasticities, private hospitals have a legal limit to the maximum output they can produce for the NHS. This fact, coupled with the different and penalizing reimbursement rate among hospital types, not only induced distortions in the production scale, but also in the efficiency level.
Looking again at figure 1, we may note that, in the input distance model, the three ownership categories are much closer to each other and all show an increase in efficiency patterns over time.
Public hospitals at the end of the period show a slight reduction, converging to NFP averages, while private structures are now at the same level of the other categories. These results do not contradict the output distance model, since we are estimating two different frontiers under two different sets of theoretical assumptions. With the input distance function we are assuming a cost-minimizing behavior of the hospital, which chooses an input vector, evaluated at exogenously determined input prices, that minimizes the cost of producing a given output vector. This assumption clearly is valid if the hospital acquires inputs in competitive markets. The behavioral assumption we are making through the output distance function is that the firm chooses an output vector that maximizes revenue at given output prices for a given input vector. The plausibility of this assumption is linked to the sale of outputs in competitive markets.
In this study, neither assumption is strictly respected. In fact, none of these models is perfectly congruent with the present incentive framework within the NHS. With a simplifying assumption, we may believe private and NFP hospitals try to minimize costs and hence aim at reducing the use of inputs. In such a context, where we have to take into account mechanisms of control over output volumes, an input-oriented model is preferable. Contrastingly, public hospitals seem to have more discretion with respect to their level of production. Therefore an output-oriented model cannot be discarded a priori, since it shifts the focus from costs to revenues.
In figure 2 
Capital-labor distribution
In our estimates, we have found a wide distribution of technical efficiencies. We attempted to ascertain whether productive structures are related to efficiency values, in order to make our analysis more precise in distinguishing among heterogeneous units. In fact, since our dataset contains the entire population of Lazio's hospitals, we have very different units in terms of size and kind of activity.
Although we have partially purged heterogeneity by using control variables for ownership type, time and location, using only observations related to acute patients, in a flexible model context that allows also for heteroscedasticity, these measures seem not to have eliminated all the possible sources of diversity from the dataset. Our idea was to draw a curve corresponding to the efficiency frontier. We made a scatter-plot of dots corresponding to the position of each hospital. In particular, the estimated efficiency determined the distance between the unit and the frontier in the graph. The radial-position is fixed depending on the capital-labor ratio value. The polar coordinates are given by the couple:
where the technical efficiency level of the i-th hospital T E i ≤ 1 if it lies below or on the frontier curve.
This kind of figure has the advantage of pointing out how estimated efficiencies vary among different capital-labor ratios and gives the possibility to distinguish particular typologies of units.
Specifically we differentiated hospitals among ownership structures for both models (figure 3).
At first glance, we may notice that private and public structures seem to sort into two different "cones" of capital-labor ratio, while NFP hospitals appear to be more evenly spread. Cones exclude outliers for both categories, i.e. they do not include hospitals below the tenth percentile or above the ninetieth percentile of the capital-labor ratio. Further there appears to be an inverse relationship between the capital-labor ratio and technical efficiency. This evidence has been already captured in the frontier estimation, where the nurse-per-bed ratio is negatively correlated with inefficiency. The more capitalized the hospital, as is the case for private hospitals, the less efficient it appears to be.
It seems reasonable that units operating with different productivity structures cannot be directly compared. The capital-labor ratio is indeed quite variable among the different structures. We tried to define the labor factor in different ways, in order to verify whether the definition made a difference.
In particular, we used three typologies of labor aggregation: the first one was the simple sum of all workers operating in the structure; the second was the simple sum of physicians and nurses operating in the hospital; and the last corresponded to a sum of five categories of workers, weighted by their estimated wage. For estimating wages we gleaned data from AOs' balance sheets, taking the total amount of salaries divided by the number of workers for each of three categories (physicians, nurses and other staff). The only labor definition which widens the spread of hospitals in the graph is the sum of physicians and nurses. However, in each of the three cases, the relative proportions are nearly the same.
Another question arises: what are the causes of relatively lower labor usage in private hospitals and higher usage in public ones? We believe that public hospitals operate in a more rigid institutional framework, inclined to keep a high number of workers, while private ones do not. Given that the latter face greater economic risk, it is reasonable to assume that they decide to turn this risk toward workers, instead of toward capital (meaning medical equipment with related costs). Another explanation from the public finance literature is that one role of public institutions is to provide employment. This phenomenon causes a high value for the capital-labor ratio in private structures, but according to our evidence, seems to penalize technical efficiency.
Conclusions
In this paper, we studied the productive process of the hospitals of the Lazio region by means of an economic analysis. We used data from the hospital discharge records provided by the Public Health
Agency of Lazio in order to derive measures of output, such as the number of discharged patients.
Further, from the Ministry of Health we obtained data concerning labor and capital used as inputs.
Our study has been limited to the pooled cross-section case, since a simple sum of squares analysis showed very little panel variation in the sample.
OLS residuals analysis showed the presence of inefficiency in the data. Subsequently, we implemented a stochastic frontier analysis to assess the level of technical efficiency achieved by the hospitals.
When deriving technology parameters, we took into account case-mix complexity. With this correction of the left hand-side of the frontier equation, we were able to address one of the main points of Newhouse's critique, i.e. the impossibility of assessing hospital production by means of efficiency analysis tools, because of excessive simplification of the productive process, especially with respect to the quality of services.
Inefficiency is negatively associated with specialization and positively with capitalization. Capitalization is typical of private hospital structures which, on average, make a less efficient use of resources when compared to public and not-for-profit hospitals. As far as the productive structure of the hospital is concerned, there seem to be increasing returns to scale, suggesting centralization of operations.
Private units work in slightly over-staffed conditions for medical staff, while public and more heavily NFP hospitals do the same for technical and administrative staff, suggesting the opportunity for a re-allocation of resources within these structures.
Our efficiency estimates are strictly related to the choice of a specific model, which depends on the theoretical and empirical assumptions one is willing to make. The input distance function model is based on a cost-minimization hypothesis, and empirically is more appropriate in studying private and NFP hospital behavior. Meanwhile, the output distance function is based on a revenue-maximization hypothesis and is more appropriate to the study of public hospital patterns. Being aware of the limitations of the model, we tried to paint a picture from the combined reading of both.
The results suggest that public and NFP hospitals make a more efficient use of resources. In fact the level of the estimated mean technical efficiency appears to be significantly higher than that of private structures in the output-oriented model, and slightly higher in the input-oriented model.
This large gap in the former model can be attributed to the different reimbursement rates among ownership categories. This turned out to be the cause of under-sizing even in private structures. The minor differences in efficiency levels reported in the input-oriented model, on the other hand, are more easily explainable as a result of the cost-minimizing assumption upon which the model is based.
Notes
1 For a good and quick review of the different nature of these structures, see [2] . 2 We closely follow the notation used in Kumbhakar & Lovell (2000) . 5 See for instance Rosko and Broyles [11] . 6 6. We attempted to use an index of hospital machineries as a more refined measure of capital, attaching their average costs as a weight. However the set of known costs is incomplete, and even if this missing data concerns only a couple of machines, we believe this might bias the index value. This may affect parameter estimates, as happened in most of the adopted model specifications. 7 Farley and Hogan [4] made an in-depth analysis of hospital specialization measures. They proposed an Information Theory Index, where specialization is given by caseload deviation from that of the typical hospital. The main pitfall of this Information Theory Index is therefore its inability to distinguish between hospitals that treat either a very narrow or a very broad range of cases, since both will tend to have relatively high index values. Hence, we decided to make use only of the Gini ratio. 8 Note that each input and output variable has been standardized with its median. 9 Public hospitals include hospitals directly managed by ASL and AOs. Hospitals assimilated to public structures are the following: 1) "Istituto qualificato presidio della USL"; 2) "Istituto di Ricovero e Cura a Carattere Scientifico (IRCCS)"; 3) "Ospedali classificati o assimilati ai sensi dell'art.1 u.c. L.132/68"; 4) "Policlinici Universitari". 10 Remember that for a correct interpretation, the sign in the distance functions must be reversed. This implies that in the output distance model, the upward shift of the frontier is given by a negative sign. While for an input distance function by a positive sign. 11 We remind that signs and magnitudes of the cross-effects represent input/output jointness. In the input specification negative cross-output terms represent output jointness, while in the output specification positive cross-input effects imply input complementarities. Total  2000  49  16  40  105  2001  49  16  38  103  2002  50  17  38  105  2003  52  17  39  108  2004  49  17  39  105  2005  45  18  36  99  Total  294  101  230 
